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ABSTRACT 
In 2015 the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board handed down a landmark 
decision on informed consent to medical treatment, heralding a legal shift to a more patient-
centred approach. Montgomery, and the extensive commentary that has followed, focuses on ‘adult 
persons of sound mind’. We consider the potential claims that may flow from a failure to 
adequately inform children. We argue that the relevance of the best interests test blurs the 
boundaries between negligence and battery. Limitations on children’s rights to make treatment 
decisions for themselves impact on their potential to claim in negligence for non-disclosure and, 
conversely, enhance the potential relevance of the tort of battery. In paediatric cases, Montgomery 
raises expectations that the law is currently ill-equipped to satisfy. Tort law provides a legal 
incentive to disclose relevant information to children but limits the availability of a remedy.  
 
KEYWORDS 




This article considers the potential tort claims that may follow from a healthcare practitioner’s 
(HCP’s) non-disclosure of information when treating a child patient. Focusing on children1 who 
are capable of contributing to or making treatment decisions, we address situations where the 
patient would have refused medical treatment had relevant information been disclosed.  
We begin with a brief reminder of relevant general principles of law. If an HCP fails to 
disclose information to a patient then they may commit the tort of battery or the tort of negligence. 
The former is committed where the medical procedure involves intentional and direct bodily 
contact with the patient.2 The consent of the patient is a defence to a battery claim but in order 
for the consent to be valid, the patient must be informed in broad terms about the nature of the 
procedure.3 The tort of negligence is committed if an HCP breaches their duty of care to the 
claimant and that breach causes actionable damage. The HCP’s duty to take reasonable care not 
to injure their patient will be breached if they fail to warn the patient of material risks in or 
reasonable alternatives to the treatment.4 The breach will have caused injury if the patient would 
not have consented to the treatment had they been warned and the risk in the treatment eventuates. 
Both torts therefore require the HCP to provide information to the patient though, as we shall 
discuss below, the level of information differs between the two. The difference is considerable in 
                                                 
* All web links last accessed 21st May 2019. 
1 ‘Children’ is shorthand for ‘children and young people’. We will differentiate between children aged under 16 and 
aged 16-17 at various points in the article. 
2 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 (Div Ct), 377 (Goff L.J.). 
3 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257 (QB). We will refer to consent as a defence to battery but there is debate 
about whether this is the case or whether lack of consent is part of the cause of action. If the latter, it would be for 
the claimant to establish that they did not consent to the defendant’s intentional and direct touching. There is some 
authority for this proposition (Freeman v Home Office (No. 2) [1984] QB 524 (CA), 539 (McCowan J.)). However, Sir 
Anthony Clarke M.R. maintained that it was ‘open to debate whether McCowan J.’s conclusion on burden of proof 
[in Freeman] is correct’ in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2006] EWCA Civ 1085, [31]. Furthermore, the editors 
of Clerk & Lindsell on Torts note that this appears inconsistent with the weight of authority that states consent is a 
defence (see the cases listed at [3-104]) and the burden of establishing a defence rests with the defendant. They state: 
‘A claimant attacked in the street with a knife should not have to plead and prove that he did not consent to the attack 
(easy though that may be). By the same token, a competent patient cut by the surgeon’s scalpel should not have to 
prove the absence of consent—it is a matter for the surgeon to justify by reference to the patient’s consent’ (MA 
Jones (Ed) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 22nd edn, 2018), [15-93]). See also FA Trindade, ‘Intentional 
Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery’ (1982) 2 OJLS 211, 229. Whichever view is preferred, it does not affect 
our core argument. 
4 The power to choose treatment is subject to the medical view that the treatment is clinically indicated: R (Burke) v 
General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [50] (Lord Phillips M.R.). 
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adult cases, but we will argue that the requirement to consider the child’s best interests could blur 
the boundary between negligence and battery. 
With regard to negligence, the Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board5 adopted a more patient-centred approach to negligent non-disclosure of information for 
‘adult person(s) of sound mind’,6 but how far does and should tort law uphold the principle of 
‘informed consent’ in the case of children? Despite there being a wealth of academic literature on 
the law of information non-disclosure as it applies to adults, until now the extent to which this law 
applies to child patients has not been explored in any depth.  
The lack of legal clarity is problematic as it may result in the autonomy of child patients 
being violated. Autonomy is equated with a person’s ‘freedom to decide what shall and shall not 
be done with their body’7 and, though the weight given to autonomy has sometimes been 
contested,8 respecting it is widely considered to be an important ethical principle. There are 
different definitions to the term autonomy in the literature. The case law tends to support a liberal 
conception that seeks to give effect not only to an individual’s current desires but also their long-
term choices and values.9 It is true that these theories of autonomy can result in different outcomes 
when determining whether an interference with an individual is morally justified. Whichever of 
these definitions of autonomy is preferred,10 though, failing to inform a patient of the risks 
involved in medical treatment could constitute an interference with autonomy and so it is not 
necessary for us to take a firm stance on this issue for the purposes of this article.  
                                                 
5 [2015] UKSC 11. 
6 Ibid., [86] (Lords Kerr and Reed). 
7 Ibid., [108] (Lady Hale). 
8 See M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm – Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (2006) 65 CLJ 397, 400-403. 
9 See J Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or 
Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235, C Purshouse, ‘How Should Autonomy be Defined in 
Medical Negligence Cases?’ (2015) 10 Clinical Ethics 107 and G Turton, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment 
Post-Montgomery: Causation and Coincidence’ (2018) 27 Med L Rev 108. 
10 The second-named author has previously argued that the ‘current desire’ view of autonomy better represents the 
case law (Purshouse, ibid.) but, as a result of Turton’s critique of his position, he now recants this view. See G Turton, 
ibid., 113-114. 
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It could also be argued that negligence focuses on carelessly caused injury and so is 
arguably ill-suited to protecting autonomy.11 But following the decision in Chatterton v Gerson12 to 
limit the scope of the tort of battery, negligence has become the dominant mechanism for 
protecting autonomy in medical treatment decisions. In 1999 Jones stated:  
 
The underlying ethical principle of informed consent is that one should respect the 
patient’s autonomy: the capacity to think, decide and act on one’s own thoughts and 
decisions freely and independently.13  
 
This was confirmed in Montgomery14 and Chester v Afshar15 before it, when the courts recognised the 
relevance of autonomy when developing the doctrine of informed consent. The issues considered 
in this article will therefore enable us to assess whether tort law is adequately respecting autonomy 
in paediatric cases. 
Furthermore, our argument has important implications for access to justice. A Freedom 
of Information request submitted by the authors to NHS Resolution indicates that, since 
Montgomery, paediatric claims related to non-disclosure of information have increased, whilst the 
number of successful claims has fallen.16 This suggests that raised expectations of information 
disclosure following Montgomery extend beyond ‘adults of sound mind’ and that access to justice in 
                                                 
11 Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA 1307, [88] (Leggatt L.J.). For arguments that the claims 
in battery are more appropriate than negligence in cases of information non-disclosure see TK Feng, ‘Failure of 
Medical Advice: Trespass or Negligence?’ (1987) 7 LS 149 and, more recently, A Beever, A Theory of Tort Liability 
(Hart: Oxford, 2016), ch 15. By way of contrast, C Beuermann has recently argued that the torts of trespass to the 
person have been overtaken by negligence and are now obsolete (‘Are the Torts of Trespass to the Person Obsolete? 
Part 2: Continued Evolution’ (2018) 26 Tort L Rev 6, 9-10 and 13-17). 
12 (n 3). 
13 MA Jones, ‘Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories’ (1999) 7 Med L Rev 103, 123. 
14 (n 5) [68] and [80] (Lords Kerr and Reed) and [108] (Lady Hale). 
15 [2004] UKHL 41, [24] (Lord Steyn) and [54] and [56] (Lord Hope). 
16 FOI_3279, 29 March 2018. Annual number of claims where patient 17 and under where informed consent / failure 
to warn was the main cause of action: Between 2010/11 and 2014/15 the highest number of annual claims was 14 
and the average 11.6. In 2015/16, the year of Montgomery, there were 18 and in 2016/17, 27. Claims closed or settled 
as a periodical payment order for the same age group: Between 2010/11 and 2014/15, the highest was 9 and the 
average 7.8. In 2015/16 there were under 5 and in 2016/17 there were 6. When expressed as a percentage of claims 
settled or closed, the average between 2010/11-2014/15 is 67.2%. In 2016/17 this dropped to 22.2%. 
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paediatric cases is limited. Indeed, we will present evidence of legal uncertainty as to the 
mechanisms for protecting information non-disclosure that supports this claim. Clarification here 
is therefore both timely and important. 
We focus on children’s interests in receiving information and the tort claims they might 
bring. Taking the existing law as a starting point, the first part of the article outlines the law so far 
as it determines when children and proxies can consent to medical treatment. We then set out a 
number of barriers to a successful claim in negligence for non-disclosure where the treatment 
involves a child. In particular, we demonstrate that the principle that child patients must be treated 
in their best interests, combined with the fact that proxies can still consent on their behalf, has 
potential to thwart claims by children for negligent non-disclosure of information. We then 
consider the tort of battery. Whereas for adult patients, battery offers only limited protection in 
cases of non-disclosure of information, we argue that the tort has paradoxical significance in 
paediatric cases. We conclude that whilst tort law provides a legal incentive to disclose relevant 
information to children, there are limitations in the availability of a remedy.  
The term ‘informed consent’ is potentially misleading given that it implies an element of 
validity which in fact is a matter for battery.17 We will therefore differentiate ‘consent’ from 
‘informed consent’ to distinguish the laws of battery and negligence, and refer to ‘(informed) 
consent’ when we seek to capture both torts.  
 
II. LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
Before discussing the tort remedies for children who have received insufficient information about 
medical treatment, it is necessary to outline the law on the legal capacity of children. This will 
determine whether they can consent to treatment and, by extension, is relevant to claims for 
negligent non-disclosure of information and battery.  
                                                 
17 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 (HCA), 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh J.J.) and 
see Montgomery (n 5) [108] (Lady Hale). 
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It is well established that children under the age of 18 can provide a valid consent in certain 
circumstances. The law recognises some children to be of sufficiently ‘sound mind’ to provide an 
effective consent, in which case there is good reason to demand that information about the 
treatment is disclosed to them. In the landmark case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA,18 
the House of Lords held that children under the age of 16 (under 16s) can consent to medical 
treatment, provided they have sufficient ‘understanding and intelligence’19 to make the decision.20 
Such children possess ‘Gillick competence’, otherwise termed ‘Gillick capacity’ to make the 
decision.21 
According to section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, young people aged 16-17 
can provide consent to surgical, medical or dental treatment which is ‘as effective as it would be if 
he were of full age’. Most of the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and 
accompanying Code,22 which govern decision-making for adults who lack capacity, also apply to 
16-17-year-olds.23 The Act presumes capacity24 and sets out a two-stage functional test for 
incapacity:25 Is there an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of a person’s mind or 
brain? If so, is the impairment sufficient that the person lacks capacity to make the relevant 
decision?  
Where a child lacks Gillick capacity, it was established in Re R26 that proxy consent should 
be obtained, in which case the HCP must decide what to disclose to the child and proxies 
respectively.27 Provided material information is disclosed to the proxy, the incapacitated child’s 
                                                 
18 [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL). 
19 Ibid., 170 (Lord Fraser). 
20 Despite later challenges, it remains good law. See R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), 
[115] (Silber J.). 
21 The terms are used interchangeably by Sir James Munby in Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695, [83]. We will 
employ the term ‘Gillick capacity’. 
22 MCA 2005 Code of Practice (TSO: 2007). 
23 MCA 2005, s 2(5). 
24 Ibid., s 1(2). 
25 Ibid., ss 2-3. 
26 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11 (CA). 
27 Ibid., 22 (Lord Donaldson M.R.). For 16-17-year-olds, the MCA 2005 s 5 makes an exception to the requirement to 
obtain consent in certain circumstances, but persons with parental responsibility would usually be consulted in 
compliance with s 4. 
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negligence claim for non-disclosure is likely to fail. Where a 16-17-year-old lacks capacity, the MCA 
sets out a framework for decision-making in the person’s best interests, requiring (where 
practicable) consultation with relevant people, including the patient.28 Where there is a reasonable 
belief of incapacity, the HCP who examines or treats the patient in their best interests is protected 
under section 5.   
While this article will at times refer specifically to Gillick capacity and MCA capacity, so as 
to distinguish the different legal sources of the child’s ability to consent to treatment, we will 
employ the generic term ‘capacity’ to denote a child’s satisfaction of either test.  
 
A. The Status of Children 
Should the fact that a patient is a child prevent them from bringing a claim in negligence or battery 
for non-disclosure? Initially, this does not seem a convincing reason for limiting these rights of 
action. It is clear that empowering children to understand their condition and treatment improves 
their health and wellbeing.29 Furthermore, assuming that one of the purposes of the law of 
(informed) consent is to protect autonomy,30 it should apply to children with capacity as, morally 
speaking, they have autonomy interests that warrant protection.31  
However, capacity does not render a child’s status equal to adults’. While children with 
requisite capacity can consent to treatment, they cannot necessarily refuse it. This stems from 
ambiguity as to the ratio of Gillick. In the majority, the two leading speeches were given by Lord 
Fraser and Lord Scarman, with Lord Bridge agreeing with both judgments. Lord Scarman 
appeared to hold that a child had a right to determine whether or not they could consent to medical 
treatment once they had capacity.32 According to this view, once a child has Gillick capacity, their 
                                                 
28 MCA 2005, s 4: See below at IV.C. 
29 The Values-Based Child and Adolescent Mental Health System Commission, What Really Matters in Children and 
Young People’s Mental Health (The Royal College of Psychiatrists: 2016), 4, accessible at 
https://valuesbasedpractice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Values-based-full-report.pdf. 
30 Cf. T Clark and D Nolan, ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) 34 OJLS 659, 676. 
31 See M Brazier and C Bridge, ‘Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent Autonomy’ (1996) 16 LS 84, 87-92. 
32 Gillick (n 18), 186. 
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consent would prevent an action in battery. In contrast, Lord Fraser’s judgment required that the 
treatment had to be in the child’s best interests before the consent to treatment would be 
considered valid.33 The consent of a child with Gillick capacity would not be sufficient to render 
treatment lawful. This is because the best interests test is not equated with the views or desires of 
the child. It is possible for treatment to be in a child patient’s best interests even if the child does 
not wish the treatment to occur. For example, in Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment)34 it was 
held that a 15-year-old girl’s refusal to consent to a heart transplant could be overridden as the 
operation would be in her best interests. The child’s views will be an important factor in the 
balancing exercise used to determine best interests, but they are not decisive. 
Controversy has been generated by the interpretation of Gillick in two Court of Appeal 
decisions where Lord Donaldson M.R. gave the leading judgments: Re R35 and Re W.36 Lord 
Donaldson asserted that the ratio of Gillick is that while a child with capacity can consent to medical 
treatment, the court or those with parental responsibility retain a concurrent right to consent.37 
They may override the child’s refusal to consent and provide consent on the child’s behalf where 
so doing would be in the child’s best interests. This means that, in addition to being insufficient, the 
consent of a child with Gillick capacity is not necessary for an HCP to avoid a battery action. The 
same principle applies to young people aged 16-17.38  
With adults, consideration of best interests by the courts only arises if it has been 
determined that the adult lacks capacity.39 It has long been established that a person with capacity 
who has attained the age of 18 may refuse treatment, even if that decision is unwise.40 As a result, 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 174. 
34 [1999] 2 FLR 1097. 
35 (n 26). 
36 [1993] Fam 64 (CA). 
37 Ibid., 78 and Re R (n 26), 22. 
38 Re W (n 36), 78. 
39 MCA 2005, s 1(5). 
40 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 (CA), 102 (Lord Donaldson); An NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v P 
[2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam), [11] (Baker J.). 
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some commentators have argued that it is illogical to say that a child, or any individual, can have 
the capacity to make a particular decision but is not capable of refusing it.41  
 Yet this critique only has force if the aim of the law is to protect children’s autonomy. Lord 
Donaldson’s interpretation of Gillick focuses not on its potential to enhance children’s autonomy, 
but to protect their welfare. Children can consent to treatment that is in their best interests if they 
have sufficient understanding and intelligence, just as they can refuse treatment that is not in their 
best interests.  
 Of course, autonomy is a relevant aspect of the child’s welfare: this is clear from reference 
to the child’s view in the Children Act 1989 welfare checklist42 and from the common law.43 The 
primary aim of the law, however, is not to protect the autonomy rights of children but to elicit 
‘what is best for the welfare of the particular child’.44 According to Re R and Re W,45 the child, 
persons with parental responsibility and the court can all provide a valid consent in order to protect 
an HCP fulfilling that aim. The law therefore allows the child’s refusal of treatment to be 
overridden to protect their best interests. This can impact on information disclosure both in 
relation to what is relayed to the child and what is shared with proxies.  
 
B. Parental Status vis-à-vis the Capacitous Child 
Parental powers are, however, limited in law and practice. In family law, the welfare of the child is 
the paramount consideration.46 The definition of parental responsibility in section 3 of the 
Children Act 1989 balances parental powers and rights with responsibilities. Sir James Munby 
                                                 
41 See J Murphy, ‘W(h)ither Adolescent Autonomy?’ (1992) 14 JSWFL 529, J Harris, ‘Consent and End of Life 
Decisions’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 10, 12 and M Freeman, ‘Rethinking Gillick’ (2005) 13 Int J Child Rts 201, 211. For 
a limited defence of this distinction see R Heywood, ‘Mature Teenagers and Medical Intervention Revisited: A Right 
to Consent, a Wrong to Refuse’ [2008] 37 CLWR 191.  
42 Children Act 1989, s 1(3)(a). 
43 Axon (n 20). 
44 Gillick (n 18), 173 (Lord Fraser). 
45 Applied in An NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v P (n 40), 12. 
46 Children Act 1989, s1(1). See J v C [1970] AC 668 (HL), 710 (Lord MacDermott) and H Reece, ‘The Paramountcy 
Principle: Consensus or Construct’ (1996) 49 CLP 267, 267. 
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recently made clear in Re D that Re W remains relevant47 but also noted that, since Gillick, the 
ambit of parental responsibility is ‘to be ascertained by reference to general community standards 
in contemporary Britain, the standards of reasonable men and women’.48 In 1993 this ambit 
extended to providing consent in the best interests of a capacitous child refusing treatment. It is 
questionable whether this remains the case.  
Post-Re W, professional guidance at first asserted parental rights to veto harmful treatment 
and recognised a resulting need for persons with parental responsibility to be properly informed.49 
But Re W was decided before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. Article 8 of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been influential in the backlash against medical 
paternalism.50 It was relevant in Montgomery51 and in assertions of children’s autonomy rights in 
Axon. In the latter case Silber J. opined that once a child has capacity to make decisions for herself, 
persons with parental responsibility lose any right under Article 8 to consent on the child’s behalf.52  
Today, professional guidance is more protective of the autonomy rights of children with 
capacity, urging a court declaration rather than reliance on parental consent where refused 
treatment would prevent loss of life or grave harm.53 The court is required to take into 
consideration the wishes and feelings of the child under the welfare checklist set out in section 
1(3) of the Children Act 1989.  The Care Quality Commission (CQC) goes further still, advising 
that: ‘Parents cannot override a competent child’s refusal to accept treatment.’54 This is a bold 
stance that runs contrary to Re R and Re W. It is an approach that places dwindling emphasis on 
parental powers once the child has capacity, and the restricted power is likely to be matched by a 
                                                 
47 Re D (A Child) (n 21), [126]. 
48 Ibid., [85]. 
49 See e.g. Welsh Assembly Government, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment (2002), 8.3, accessible at 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/Publications/treatmentgd-e.pdf.  
50 See J Fortin, ‘Accommodating Children’s Rights in the Post Human Rights Act Era’ (2006) 69 MLR 299, 320, Pretty 
v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 (2346/02) and VC v Slovakia (2014) 59 EHRR 29 (18968/07). 
51 Montgomery (n 5), [80] (Lords Kerr and Reed). 
52 Axon (n 20), [130]. 




limited right to information about the child’s treatment. The case law adopts an approach that 
encourages HCPs to share information but, does not extend to breaching the child’s confidentiality 
without a strong best interests justification.55  
If the child lacks capacity, HCPs can rely on parental consent. In this regard, the vagueness 
and high threshold of the Gillick test can result in assessments that effectively focus on outcomes 
and inadequately protect autonomy.56 On the other hand, reduced reliance on parental veto means, 
as we shall see, that HCPs will need to furnish the child with relevant information in order to 
determine whether the decision is valid and made with capacity. The law is less concerned with a 
doctor-centred approach protecting HCPs from liability and increasingly sympathetic to a patient-
centred approach protecting patient autonomy. 
However, the development of respect for children’s autonomy only goes so far. In the next 
section we argue that limitations on their right to decide may impact on their ability to claim in 
negligence for non-disclosure of material information.   
 
III. NEGLIGENCE 
A. Negligent Non-Disclosure of Information57 
The HCP’s duty of care includes giving the patient enough information so that they can make a 
decision whether to accept or reject treatment.58 Prior to Montgomery, the case of Sidaway v Bethlem 
Royal Hospital59 governed the standard of care expected of HCPs in information non-disclosure 
cases. Marked differences characterised the speeches of their Lordships but the majority were 
broadly supportive of utilising the Bolam test to determine whether an HCP had breached their 
                                                 
55 See Gillick (n 18), 174 (Lord Fraser) and Axon (n 20), [103] (Silber J.). 
56 See E Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and Resolving Problems with the Concept of Child Competence’ 24 
(2014) LS 103. 
57 Whilst non-disclosure may also lead to actionable psychiatric harm, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
58 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 (HL), 893 (Lord Diplock). 
59 Ibid. 
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duty to advise patients.60 An HCP would escape liability if he or she could find a responsible body 
of medical opinion that would have chosen not to inform the patient of a particular risk.61 
 In Montgomery it was held that the majority decision in Sidaway was flawed.62 Echoing Lord 
Scarman’s dissenting judgment in Sidaway, Lady Hale asserted that informed consent is firmly part 
of UK law.63 Henceforth, HCPs must disclose information that a reasonable patient would 
consider significant or, where the HCP is or ought reasonably to be aware, that the actual patient 
finds significant.64 Reflecting a shift in ‘societal attitudes towards the practice of medicine’65 and 
developments in other common law countries,66 the decision puts the patient and their rights 
centre-stage.67 Lords Kerr and Reed said: 
 
An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available 
forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment 
interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken.68 
 
B. Negligence Claims by Children with Capacity 
For children, the powers of persons with parental responsibility to overrule their capacitous 
treatment decisions are, in practice, limited. However, the courts are willing to override a capacitous 
refusal in sufficiently serious cases, where the treatment is deemed to be in the child’s best 
                                                 
60 See the judgments of Lord Diplock, Lord Bridge (with whom Lord Keith agreed) and Lord Templeman. 
61 See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (QB). 
62 Montgomery (n 5), [86] (Lords Kerr and Reed). 
63 Ibid., [107]. 
64 Ibid., [87] (Lord Kerr and Reed). 
65 Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2017] SGCA 38,[120] (Menon C.J.). There is some debate about whether 
the judgment in Montgomery is actually revolutionary or merely an evolution of the patient-friendly decisions following 
Sidaway. See R Heywood and J Miola, ‘The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient 
at the Heart of the Matter’ (2017) 133 LQR 296, 298.  
66 The fact that Canada (Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880 (SCC)) and Australia (Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 
(HCA)) had adopted patient-centred approaches to risk disclosure influenced the decision in Montgomery (n 5), [70]-
[73]. Post-Montgomery, a similar approach was adopted in Singapore in Hii Chii Kok (n 65). 
67 See T Elliot, ‘A Break with the Past? Or More of the Same?’ (2015) 31 PN 190 and Heywood and Miola (n 65). Cf. 
C Hobson, ‘No (,) More Bolam Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’ (2016) 79 MLR 488 and J Montgomery, 
‘Patient No Longer? What Next in Healthcare Law?’ (2017) 70 CLP 73. 
68 Montgomery (n 5), [87].  
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interests.69 Best interests is a primary consideration as a ‘universal theme of the various national 
and international instruments’,70 including Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Whilst the principles of informed consent applicable to adults are shifting 
inexorably from a transferal of responsibility designed to defend HCPs from tortious liability to a 
means of protecting patient autonomy, Re W adopted a paternalistic approach whereby a valid and 
informed consent provides a ‘flak jacket’ to protect the HCP from liability.71 The decision-making 
powers conferred on children by virtue of their capacity are restricted.72 We will argue that the 
concept of best interests impacts on consenting children’s ability to claim in negligence. 
Children can bring claims for negligent diagnosis and treatment.73 It has long been 
established that HCPs owe a duty of care to their patients and that, in addition to diagnosis and 
treatment, this duty encompasses advising the patient.74 Although sometimes issues may arise 
about the extent of the HCP’s duty to his or her patient,75 there is, ostensibly, no reason why the 
HCP would not owe this duty to children with capacity whose consent is relied upon. 
The test for breach in information non-disclosure cases, set out in Montgomery, establishes 
that an HCP is under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any 
material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant 
treatments.76 As mentioned earlier, these are assessed from the position of the reasonable patient 
(or the actual patient where the HCP ought reasonably to be aware that the patient would find the 
risks or alternatives significant).  
For 16-17-year-olds, Montgomery is likely to apply because the Family Law Reform Act 1969 
treats them like adults. For under 16s, application would rely on the incremental extension from 
‘adult patients of sound mind’ to children with Gillick capacity. There are grounds for this given 
                                                 
69 An NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v P (n 40). 
70 ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [45] (Lord Kerr). 
71 Re W (n 36), 78 (Lord Donaldson M.R.). 
72 See Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick?’ (n 56). 
73 See e.g. Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074 (HL); Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619 (HL). 
74 Sidaway (n 58), 881 (Lord Scarman). 
75 See for example McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL). 
76 Montgomery (n 5), [87] (Lords Reed and Kerr). 
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the legal recognition of the child’s capacity and Lady Hale’s statement in Montgomery that: ‘The 
medical profession must respect her choice, unless she lacks the legal capacity to decide.’77 
However, as we have seen, capacity does not equate children with adults, and so this extension is 
not assured. If Montgomery were not to apply, HCPs would not be considered negligent if they were 
acting in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion ‘merely because there is a body 
of opinion who would take a contrary view’.78 The focus would not be on what the reasonable or 
actual patient would want to know, but on what the reasonable doctor would disclose in the 
circumstances. 
Causation provides a more extensive hurdle. Usually, in order for factual causation to be 
established, the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that ‘but for’ the failure to 
warn they would have avoided the damage. First, the failure to warn must have caused actionable 
damage, which means that the risk inherent in the procedure must have eventuated: no claim will 
succeed where the procedure improves the claimant’s health. Second, the patient must 
demonstrate that they would not have undergone the treatment if they had been properly warned 
and thus avoided the bad outcome. Where a patient’s treatment turns out to be unsuccessful, there 
is an incentive for them to say that they would not have undergone the operation, otherwise the 
claim would fail. The court is wary of hindsight bias and will give weight to an objective assessment 
of whether the reasonable patient would have undergone the procedure if warned (the objective 
limb). If the reasonable patient would still have gone ahead then it is for the claimant to 
demonstrate that they would have acted differently to the reasonable patient (the subjective limb).79 
This approach has been confirmed post-Montgomery.80 Finally, under the exceptional rule in Chester 
v Afshar, causation may also be established if the patient would have delayed having the treatment 
                                                 
77 Ibid., [115]. 
78 Bolam (n 61), 587 (McNair J.). 
79 Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA [1994] 5 Med LR 285 (QB). See also Turton, (n 9).  
80 Diamond v Royal Devon Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWHC 1485 (QB), [47] (Freedman H.H.J.). Indeed, recent 
cases on causation could be regarded as more conservative than the patient-centred approach to breach of duty taken 
in Montgomery. See Duce (n 11), Correia v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 356; MC 
& JC v Birmingham Women's NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 1334 (QB); Barrett v Sandwell & West Birmingham 
Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 2627 (QB).  
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and therefore avoided the risk by running it at a different time or in different circumstances.81 We 
will consider the Chester exception below. 
Prima facie, it appears that an HCP should warn a child who has capacity of the risks of 
treatment. If a capacitous child has a right to determine their own medical treatment then there 
would be no barriers, beyond those that adults face, to them bringing a negligence claim. A failure 
by an HCP to warn the capacitous child of material risks in the treatment, or reasonable alternatives 
to it, would constitute a breach of duty and, if those risks eventuated and the child would have 
refused the treatment if warned, causation could be established. The child would have been able 
to avoid the damage by not undergoing the risky treatment.  
A problem with this analysis is that even if an HCP breaches their duty to disclose 
information, provided the treatment is required in the child’s best interests, the child will have 
difficulty convincing the court that they would have avoided the risks involved in the procedure. 
This is because, given alternative consent would have been provided even if the child had refused 
the treatment, it is more likely than not that they would have undergone the procedure even if they 
were properly warned.  
Let us imagine that an HCP fails to warn a child of a ten per cent risk of paralysis inherent 
in a procedure and that risk eventuates. The child may be able to demonstrate that if they were 
warned of the risk then they would not have consented to the operation. But that alone does not 
mean that they would have avoided the risk. If the case for treatment is compelling on the basis 
that it is required in the child’s best interests, it is more likely than not that the HCP would have 
been able to obtain alternative consent from a proxy. If so, then it appears that the risk of injury 
would not have been avoided and the failure to warn would have made no difference to the 
eventual outcome.82 A negligence claim would fail.  
                                                 
81 Chester (n 15). See J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’ (2006) 122 LQR 426.  
82 This is assuming that the proxy consent would have been obtained at the same time.  
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Chester v Afshar may assist children who have not been informed of the material risks of 
treatment: they might be able to establish causation if they can convince the court that they would 
have delayed the procedure if they had been warned. As the case is complicated, it is worth 
recounting the facts. In breach of duty, the defendant failed to warn the claimant of a 1-2 per cent 
risk of cauda equina syndrome inherent in back surgery. This risk would exist no matter how 
expertly the surgery was performed. The claimant underwent the surgery on 21 November 1994. 
Although it was carefully performed, the risk eventuated and she became paralysed. In her claim 
against the defendant, she did not argue that if warned of this risk she would never have undergone 
the surgery. Had she done so, causation would have been straightforward as she would have 
avoided the risk altogether. Instead, she argued that she would have sought further advice, with 
the result that the surgery probably would have taken place at a later date.   
By a narrow majority, she was successful in the House of Lords (Lords Bingham and 
Hoffmann dissenting). In the majority, Lord Steyn said that her ‘right of autonomy and dignity 
can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation 
principles.’83 Although the case has spurred a vast academic literature about whether it can be 
reconciled from ordinary causation principles and, if it cannot, whether such a departure from 
orthodoxy is justified,84 we do not need to take a stance on these debates.  
Notwithstanding some views to the contrary,85 the idea that Chester means damages can be 
awarded for lost autonomy has been resoundingly rejected by the Court of Appeal in England and 
Wales and by the highest court in Singapore.86 A child patient must therefore have suffered 
personal injury as a result of the HCP’s negligent non-disclosure in order to claim. Furthermore, 
                                                 
83 Chester (n 15), [24]. 
84 A useful summary of the debate can be found in Turton (n 9) 118-1119 and Clark and Nolan (n 30). 
85 For a recent advocate of the position that lost autonomy should be recognised as actionable damage see T Keren-
Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy in English Negligence Law: Inconsistent Recognition’ (2018) 26 Med L Rev 
585, 592-593. For a summary of this position see C Purshouse, ‘Liability for Lost Autonomy in Negligence: 
Undermining the Coherence of Tort Law?’ (2015) 22 Torts LJ 226, fn 45 and ‘Autonomy, Affinity and the Assessment 
of Damages: ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20 and Shaw v Kovak [2017] EWCA Civ 1028’ (2018) 26 
Med L Rev 675, fn 1.  
86 See Shaw v Kovak [2017] EWCA Civ 1028 and ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20 respectively. The 
same conclusion was also reached in Diamond (n 80). 
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while, as Turton notes, subsequent decisions have ‘sought to confine the Chester principle 
narrowly’,87 it allows factual and legal causation to be established if the patient would have delayed 
the treatment if warned. This may assist a child patient in establishing causation but it is more 
likely to be successful where the treatment is elective and not mandated in the child’s best interests. 
In the latter type of case, it may not be possible to delay treatment. 
 Even if the treatment would ultimately be considered by a court to be in the child’s best 
interests, Chester will assist the child if she can show that the process to determine best interests – 
namely court authorisation – would have delayed the procedure. Let us imagine during a Monday 
consultation an HCP failed to warn a child patient of a 10 per cent risk in surgery. The child 
underwent surgery on a Wednesday and the surgery carried a 10 per cent inherent risk of injury. 
As in Chester, the evidence indicates that this unfortunate outcome is liable to strike at random (so 
10 patients in every 100 will be injured). If this risk eventuated then, according to Chester, causation 
would be established if the child claimant could demonstrate that they would have delayed the 
surgery. If it took place at a later date – say, Friday – then there would be a 90 per cent chance of 
avoiding injury. It would be more likely than not that the injury would not have occurred. 
 Chester therefore offers some hope to child claimants, but it is subject to limitations referred 
to above regarding criticism of and reluctance to apply the case. Furthermore, it may not be 
possible to establish delay as there is often a time gap between information disclosure and the 
procedure. Again, let us imagine an HCP fails to warn the child on Monday of a 10 per cent risk 
inherent in surgery that is in the child’s best interests and the surgery is scheduled to take place on 
Wednesday. The child would not have consented if warned and the risk eventuates. Provided the 
consent of the court or a proxy could be obtained before Wednesday and the surgery proceeds as 
planned, the failure to warn would make no difference. Chester offers only limited assistance and 
causation represents a stumbling block for children. It will only apply in situations where the child 
                                                 
87 Turton (n 9), 121. See Meiklejohn v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 120, Crossman v St 
George's Healthcare Trust [2016] EWHC 2878 (QB) and Correia (n 80). 
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can demonstrate that if they had been properly informed the treatment would have been delayed, 
no alternative consent would have been obtained and that the risk would have been avoided. 
So far, we have focussed on children with capacity who accept treatment they would have 
refused (in favour of either no treatment or alternative treatment) if properly informed. What of 
patients who suffer harm having refused all treatment in circumstances where they would have 
chosen treatment had they been given material information about reasonable treatment options? 
If Montgomery applies to children, it might assist here because whilst the selection of variant and 
alternative options is a medical consideration,88 the communication of them to the patient is 
governed by Montgomery and therefore by the reasonable and particular patient limbs of the test for 
materiality.89 Again, in the case of non-disclosure, the patient would need to show that the 
(alternative) treatment would have been accepted and that it would, on balance of probability, have 
averted the harm suffered. It is unlikely to be enough for the patient to reframe their damage as a 
loss of a chance of avoiding injury.90  
A third potential stumbling block exists in the form of the defence of therapeutic 
exception. This applies when disclosure would ‘be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’.91 
The Department of Health has advised that, for adult patients, ‘serious detriment’ means ‘more 
than that the patient might become upset or decide to refuse treatment.’92 Given the legal 
prioritisation of child welfare, might a broader exception be supported in the case of children? If 
so, an HCP could argue that informing a child patient of risks would have a negative effect on the 
child’s health where it is likely to cause the child to refuse beneficial treatment.93 The Supreme 
                                                 
88 Montgomery (n 5), [83], Duce (n 11), [33] (Hamblen L.J.). 
89 Montgomery, ibid., [87] (Lords Kerr and Reed) and Sidaway (n 58), 904 (Lord Templeman). 
90 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 (HL) and Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 do not completely 
rule out such claims but they appear unlikely and, as far as we are aware, no court has allowed a claim to succeed on 
this basis (see Rachael Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (CUP: Cambridge, 2016) 469-475). In any event, loss of a chance 
claims are beyond the scope of this article as the law is equally applicable to adults and raises no issues particular to 
child patients. 
91 Montgomery (n 5) [88] (Lord Kerr and Reed) and see [85] and [91].  
92 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment (2009), [19]-[21], accessible at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/138296/dh_103653__1_.pdf. 
93 Reluctance on the part of HCPs to disclose information they consider harmful is demonstrated in Re L (Medical 
Treatment: Gillick Competence) [1999] 2 FCR 524, [1998] 2 FLR 810. One of the grounds for finding L to be incompetent 
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Court emphasised that this exception was ‘limited’ and should not be abused,94 but that related to 
adult patients. We would argue that a child who would be harmed by the disclosure of material 
information may lack the information required to make a capacitous decision, in which case proxy 
consent should be sought.95  
In practice, it will be sensible for an HCP to comply with Montgomery and advise children 
who have capacity of material risks in treatment and reasonable alternatives, particularly because 
the HCP may be incorrect in their assessment that the treatment is in the child’s best interests. 
The less compelling the case for treatment, the more likely the child will be able to establish that 
their views were central to a best interests assessment. Consider, for example, a child who consents 
to a cosmetic procedure on the basis of inadequate information and can demonstrate that they 
would have refused consent had they known the risks, such that a court would not have considered 
the procedure to be in the child’s best interests. The child would have been able to avoid the risk 
in the treatment (as it is likely that a proxy would not have consented to it) and so might succeed 
in a negligence action.  
Negligence therefore offers an incentive to disclose information to children with capacity, 
but in the event of non-disclosure, the chances of a remedy are slim. Hurdles exist in relation to 
breach, causation and the HCP’s ability to rely on the therapeutic exception. 
  
C. Negligence Claims by Children who Lack Capacity  
Additional limitations apply if the child lacks capacity. Children in this position maintain an interest 
in participating in the decision, and a failure to involve them might result in harmful treatment that 
would otherwise have been refused in their best interests. Nevertheless, given that a proxy will 
provide consent (or, in the case of 16-17-year-olds, treatment will be provided in accordance with 
                                                 
was that she had not been informed of the likely horrific nature of her death should her refusal of blood products 
have been upheld. 
94 Montgomery (n 5), [91] (Lords Kerr and Reed). 
95 See below at IV.A. 
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section 5 of the MCA) it is unlikely that a duty of care to disclose information to the child exists. 
Even if it did, Montgomery’s relevance is dubious given its explicit restriction to those with capacity. 
If Montgomery does not apply to patients lacking capacity, then the Bolam test would continue to 
govern the standard of care.  
A proxy (with parental responsibility) has a right to consent to treatment in an under 16-
year-old’s best interests and needs relevant information to make an informed and valid decision. 
However, a claim by the proxy is unlikely to focus on their loss of autonomy because the function 
of providing consent is not to protect the autonomy interests of the adult, but to prioritise the 
child’s welfare.96 The proxy may have a claim in negligent information disclosure on the child’s 
behalf if a failure to inform the proxy led to a decision to treat that would have come within the 
scope of the proxy’s parental responsibility to refuse.  
 
IV. BATTERY 
Having outlined the potential difficulties children face in claiming in negligence, we now turn to 
battery. Our aim is not to provide a single definitive position but to outline a variety of possible 
arguments that might be raised as to battery’s relevance. These arguments demonstrate the 
paradoxical relevance of battery to children and provide an additional incentive to disclose to 
children information needed to make a decision. 
In Collins v Wilcock, Goff L.J. defined battery as: ‘the actual infliction of unlawful force on 
another person’.97 As a trespass tort, the touching must be intentional and direct.98 This tort is 
actionable per se, meaning that, unlike with negligence, there is no need for the claimant to suffer 
any loss or damage. Consent provides ‘those concerned in the treatment with a defence to…a civil 
                                                 
96 Children Act 1989, s 1(1). See also Gillick (n 18), 173 (Lord Fraser). 
97 Collins (n 2), 377 (Goff L.J.). See also Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 (CA), 252-253 (Croom-Johnson L.J.). 
98 See Wilson (n 97), 249 (Croom-Johnson L.J.) and Reynolds v Clarke (1725) 1 Stra 634, 636 (Fortescue C.J.) respectively. 
Recklessness will suffice for the mental element of the tort according to Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 
(QB), [67] (Elias J.).  
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claim for damages for trespass to the person’.99 In relation to unconsented to bodily invasions, the 
case law is clear that a claim in battery will lie in the case of an adult with mental capacity,100 and 
by extension to a young person of 16 or 17. For children under 16 too, treatment without any 
consent constitutes a battery, except in cases of emergency.101 Consent may come from the child 
or a proxy, such as a parent or the court. 
Historically, the prevalent view in the literature was that ‘it would be very much against the 
interests of justice if actions which are really based on a failure by the doctor to perform his duty 
adequately to inform were pleaded in trespass’.102 Brazier argued that after Sidaway ‘[l]iability in 
trespass for failure to disclose risks appeared to have been stamped on’.103 She said that bringing 
an action against a doctor in battery appears to place them on a par with the police officer who 
beats a suspect.104  
There is, however, evidence that the courts could, and should, consider utilising the tort 
in paediatric cases. The evidence in question is of a more permissive stance regarding the 
protection of patient autonomy via the tort of battery. Since Brazier’s important article, F v West 
Berkshire HA105 confirmed that hostility was not a requirement for battery. There has also been a 
retreat from medical paternalism106 and a reduction in deference to healthcare professionals.107 
Tacit reliance on battery is at the heart of the landmark decision in Aintree University Hospitals NHS 
Trust v James.108 There, the Supreme Court emphasised the unlawfulness of continued medical 
treatment that was not justified in the best interests of a patient who lacked capacity. The Court 
                                                 
99 Re W (n 36), 76 (Lord Donaldson M.R.). Cf. the discussion fn 3 as to whether consent is a defence or absence of 
consent is part of the cause of action. 
100 Chatterton (n 3) subject to MCA 2005, s 5. 
101 Re R (n 26), 22 (Lord Donaldson M.R.); Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, 
SI 2014/2936, reg 11(1). Once the minor is 16 or over, the need for consent is subject to the MCA 2005: Reg 11(3). 
102 Chatterton (n 3), 443 (Bristow J.). Cf. Feng (n 11), 164 and Beever, (n 11) ch 15. 
103 M Brazier, ‘Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law?’ (1987) 7 LS 169, 179. 
104 Ibid. 
105 [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL). 
106 Montgomery (n 5), [81] (Lords Kerr and Reed). 
107 See S Devaney and S Holm, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective’ (2018) 
26 Med L Rev 202. 
108 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67. 
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recognised that ‘the fundamental question is whether it is lawful to give the treatment, not whether 
it is lawful to withhold it.’109 Consider also Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust,110 where Butler-Sloss P. 
upheld Ms B’s refusal of treatment even though it would result in her death. She had capacity to 
make the decision so continued treatment, absent valid consent, would constitute a battery.111  
An argument that the courts should permit battery claims in paediatric cases flows from 
the relevance of best interests and evidence of barriers to children claiming in negligence. For adult 
patients, in order for a valid consent to exist it has to be given by someone with capacity, be 
voluntary and the individual concerned has to know what they are consenting to, which requires 
them to be given at least some information about the treatment. All that is required is that they are 
informed in broad terms about the nature of the treatment.112  
Paradoxically, the tort that offers minimal protection to adult informational autonomy may 
have extended significance to under 16s for three reasons: firstly, the application of a different test 
for capacity; secondly, the requirement to demonstrate capacity; and, thirdly, the relevance of the 
best interests test regardless of capacity. As we have seen, the best interests test is also relevant to 
young people of 16-17 which suggests that the law of battery may also have special relevance to 
this age group.  
 
A. Non-Disclosure and the Test for Capacity 
Let us take the most tentative reason first. For children found to have Gillick capacity (unlike 
adults), the tort of battery might be committed where the child is given substandard information 
because a higher threshold for what constitutes a valid consent may apply. Lord Scarman said it 
was ‘not enough’ that the child should ‘understand the nature of the advice which is being given’.113  
                                                 
109 Ibid., 20. This was recently confirmed in An NHS Trust v Y [2018] UKSC 46, [92] (Lady Black). 
110 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
111 Ibid., [97].  
112 Chatterton (n 3). 
113 Gillick (n 18), 189.  
 23 
In order for children to have capacity to consent they need to have ‘sufficient maturity and 
understanding of what is involved.’114 Lord Scarman said that minors should ‘understand fully what 
is proposed’.115 This indicates that in order for a child to have capacity they need to have a greater 
understanding of the consequences of the decision than an adult in a comparable situation, which 
in turn would impact on the requirements to disclose information.116 If the child’s consent is to be 
relied upon, disclosure must enable this high level of understanding or risk liability in battery.  
What must the child understand? We have seen that Montgomery moves away from the 
paternalistic model of the HCP proposing a treatment and the patient deciding whether or not to 
accept it. Instead, where reasonable variant and alternative treatments exist, the HCP should 
identify them and their risks and the patient should be furnished with information and dialogue 
sufficient to choose between them. It is unclear whether the reasonableness of alternative 
treatments is determined by Bolam or Montgomery,117 but the former seems likely.118 If Montgomery 
applies to children, then the standard of disclosure in negligence might have relevance to what is 
required of the child with Gillick capacity: coherence might require that the test setting out what 
must be disclosed (for the purposes of negligence) and the test requiring what must be fully 
understood (in battery) converge. At the risk of repetition, this is not relevant in adult cases because 
adults are not required to have full understanding to make a valid consent.  
If this interpretation were adopted, fewer children would be found to have Gillick capacity, 
but non-disclosure of risks or reasonable alternatives could potentially lead to a claim in battery if 
the child’s consent (as opposed to a proxy’s or the doctrine of necessity) was relied upon. It would 
need to be established that a failure to provide information resulted in denial of the choice of 
reasonable alternatives (potentially including not having the treatment), so that the child cannot 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 On which see S Gilmore and J Herring, ‘“No” is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy’ [2011] 23 
CFLQ 3 cf. E Cave and J Wallbank, ‘Minors' Capacity to Refuse Treatment: A Reply to Gilmore and Herring' (2012) 
20 Med L Rev 423. 
117 Heywood and Miola (n 65). 
118 Duce (n 11). 
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be said to have fully understood the decision. Without this level of understanding their decision 
cannot be regarded as capacitous, thus rendering their consent invalid. In the absence of harm, 
damages would be minimal, but battery serves a vindicatory function with respect to the interest 
in physical integrity, or protection from unwanted physical contact.  
However, there is evidence of a softening in the judicial approach to Gillick capacity. Gillick 
was recently applied for the first time in the context of a minor’s consent to adoption in Re S.119 
Counsel argued that full understanding of the implications of adoption and the legal processes was 
required. Cobb J. disagreed, preferring instead to focus on sufficiency of understanding, importing 
the (adult) MCA approach to Gillick capacity.120 A test based on ‘sufficient’ rather than ‘full’ 
understanding would enable more children to provide consent. Like adults, capacity would be 
decision-specific taking into consideration the factual context.121 Like adults, children would be 
reliant upon negligence if they wanted to argue that disclosure was sufficient to allow valid consent 
but insufficient to allow informed consent.  
It therefore seems that if the Gillick approach is followed, a consenting child may have a 
claim in battery if the information was not sufficient to allow full understanding, but if the 
reasoning in Re S is applied in medical treatment cases, the information required to ensure 
‘sufficient’ understanding would align child and adult cases in this respect. 
 
B. Non-Disclosure and the Requirement to Demonstrate Capacity 
A related argument focuses on the requirement to demonstrate capacity. Re S suggests an MCA-
aligned approach in relation to the test for Gillick capacity but does not alter the fact that for 
children under the age of 16, capacity is not assumed:122 the section 1(2) presumption of capacity 
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not apply. Thus, a child who is incapable of understanding 
                                                 
119 Re S (Child as Parent: Adoption: Consent) [2017] EWHC 2729 (Fam). 
120 Ibid., [60]. 
121 City of York Council v C [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [35]. 
122 Gillick (n 18), 169 (Lord Fraser) and 186 (Lord Scarman). 
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need not be informed, but a child who is so capable and whose consent is relied upon in defence 
to battery, must be shown to actually understand the relevant information, which in turn requires 
information disclosure. Because under-16s must be shown to have capacity, it seems an 
informational component attaches to its assessment.  
Ambiguity surrounds the potential liability in trespass of an HCP who misjudges 
(in)capacity. The pre-MCA case law on adults offers some assistance. In Re T, Straughton L.J. said: 
 
Some will say that, when there is doubt whether an apparent refusal of consent is valid 
in circumstances of urgent necessity, the decision of a doctor acting in good faith 
ought to be conclusive. … However, I cannot find authority that the decision of a 
doctor as to the existence or refusal of consent is sufficient protection, if the law 
subsequently decides otherwise. So the medical profession, in the future as in the past, 
must bear the responsibility unless it is possible to obtain a decision from the courts.123 
 
Outside the application of the MCA, mistaken belief as to the validity of consent or refusal will 
not necessarily justify treatment. A test case might develop a defence based on reasonable belief, as 
per the MCA.124 There are good reasons for so doing, ‘otherwise, physicians would be encouraged 
to err on the side of non-treatment if a doubt about the patient’s competence arises’.125 If so, then 
in order to rely on a child’s consent, information disclosure must be sufficient to allow reasonable 
assessment of capacity (rather than the basic level of information required for validity in the case 
of adults assumed to have capacity). Failure to inform at this level may give rise to a claim in 
battery. 
 
                                                 
123 Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18, [60]-[61]. And see Re F (n 105), 78 (Lord Goff). 
124 See Re MB (Caesarean Section) [1997] 2 FLR 426 (CA), 438 (Butler-Sloss L.J.): ‘The only situation in which it is lawful 
for the doctors to intervene is if it is believed that the adult patient lacks the capacity to decide’ (emphasis added). 
125 S Michalowski, ‘Trial and Error at the End of Life – No Harm Done?’ (2007) 27(1) OJLS 257, 259. 
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C. Non-Disclosure and Best Interests 
If information disclosure is required to assess an under 16’s capacity, then even if the treatment is 
in their best interests, disclosure that is insufficient to assess capacity might result in battery unless 
the defence of necessity applies, or proxy consent is sought.  
An alternative argument is that even if basic information is sufficient for children to 
provide a valid consent, the tort of battery may still have resonance if the correct interpretation of 
Gillick and subsequent cases of Re R and Re W is that a child must be treated in their best interests. 
Battery might be committed if the consent of the child is relied upon in a situation where 
consultation is insufficient to generate a reasonable belief that the treatment is in their best interests 
and the treatment is shown not to be in their best interests. 
This argument develops in three stages. First, because best interests are not a purely 
medical consideration, consultation is required to make a determination that takes into account 
the particular interests of the child. Second, the HCP must have a reasonable belief that a course 
of action is in the patient’s best interests and the belief will not be reasonable if the HCP failed to 
adequately consult a child who is capable of contributing to the decision to a level that would 
determine their best interests. Third, if the child can show that adequate consultation would have 
led to a different appraisal of their best interests and therefore a different treatment decision and 
the decision taken was contrary to their interests, they might claim in battery.  
 An HCP cannot determine the child’s best interests on clinical grounds alone.126 The 
Supreme Court has recognised that an important part of the best interests determination is to 
consult the child to ascertain their views.127 This emanates from Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child128 and is featured in the Children Act 1989 welfare 
checklist.129 HCPs who fail to engage with the child can err in their assessment of best interests 
                                                 
126 Re T (A Minor) (Wardship Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242 (CA), 250-251 (Butler-Sloss L.J.), Aintree (n 108), 
[39] (Lady Hale). 
127 ZH (n 70), [34]-[35] (Lady Hale). 
128 Ibid, [34]. 
129 Children Act 1989, s1(3). 
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even if their motives are honourable and a relevant consent is obtained. In the 1976 case of Re 
D,130 Dr Gordon, a consultant paediatrician, supported by a consultant gynaecologist made a 
clinical judgement that an 11-year-old girl with Sotos Syndrome should be sterilised for non-
therapeutic purposes with her mother’s consent. A consultant psychiatrist challenged the decision 
and the court held the operation was neither medically indicated nor necessary, that it would an 
infringement of her rights and was contrary to her best interests.131 The court lamented Dr 
Gordon’s refusal to consult relevant others.132 The evidence suggested that Dr Gordon had already 
performed two similar operations in Sheffield.133 Had those cases come before a court post-
operatively, there would have been strong grounds for a claim in trespass given the finding of the 
court in Re D that it was, in fact, contrary to D’s interests.134 
As for reasonable belief in best interests, we must start with the position relating to 16-17-
year-olds. If they are reasonably supposed to lack capacity, the MCA provides a defence for an 
HCP who, taking account of the factors listed in section 4 of the Act, ‘reasonably believes that what 
he does or decides is in the best interests of the person concerned.’135 This means that the outcome 
of the treatment does not actually have to be in the best interests of the patient lacking capacity 
provided that the HCP reasonably believes it to be. Under the MCA, for an HCP’s ‘reasonable belief’ 
that treatment was in the incapacitous patient’s best interests to be a valid defence, certain 
procedural requirements set out in section 4 must be satisfied. These include, where practicable, 
consultation with the patient and relevant others.136 Failure to do so can result in battery137 and 
                                                 
130 (A Minor) (Wardship) (Sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185 (Fam). Cited in Re F (n 105), 20, 41, 69 and 79.  
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137 ZH v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 69, [88] (Lord Dyson M.R.). In Esegbona v King’s College 
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Aggravated damages were awarded for false imprisonment. 
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breach of Article 8 ECHR.138 16-17-year-olds who lack capacity cannot consent, but best interests 
is no defence to battery if the best interests decision was not reasonable because they or others 
were not properly consulted.  
For consenting 16-17-year-olds with capacity who have been given basic information 
sufficient to make a valid consent, one might assume that, like adults, they have no claim in battery. 
But if it is accepted that Re W requires the decision to be in their best interests, and there is a 
failure to adequately consult them to determine those best interests, and a court finds that the 
decision was not in their best interests, they could argue that their consent was invalid.  
Re W applies the best interests test regardless of capacity. It does so in the specific context 
of refusal of life-sustaining treatment and may extend no further, but welfare is the paramount 
consideration under the Children Act 1989 and cases such as Re W indicate that the age of 16 is 
not a ‘bright-line’.139 Moreover, attempts to limit Re W focus on allowing young people with 
capacity to define their own best interests. In non-disclosure cases we are concerned with children 
who have been denied that opportunity due to inadequate consultation.  
If the HCP has a reasonable belief that treatment was in the young person’s interests there 
will be no battery where the child consents, even if consultation was minimal and whether or not 
it was in fact in their interests. But if the HCP’s view that the decision is in their best interests is 
unreasonable because consultation was minimal and a court finds that the decision was not in fact 
in the young person’s best interests, then the child could argue that the limited consultation was 
insufficient to protect their best interests and rendered their consent invalid.  
The position for under 16-year-olds is less clear. In Re F, Lord Bridge asserted that where 
treatment is curative, doctors should be ‘immune from liability in trespass’ where they have ‘acted 
with due skill and care’.140 Lord Donaldson recognised that the duty to consult will vary according 
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to the complexity of the treatment. Where the course is unclear ‘for example, a variety of different 
treatments are available each involving different potential risks and benefits’, greater consultation 
may be required ‘in order for the doctor to satisfy himself, and it may be subsequently a court, that 
he is performing his duty under the law and so is immune from suit’.141  
 Because the principles that influenced the framing of the MCA are also relevant to under-
16s, a court is likely to require reasonable belief rather than proof that the outcome was in the 
child’s best interests. Again, it will be difficult for an HCP who has not sufficiently informed a 
consenting child to demonstrate that their belief of the child’s best interests was reasonably held. 
As such, subject to evidence that disclosure would cause harm, the HCP will need to inform such 
children in order to obtain their views and establish a reasonable belief of what is in their best 
interests.  
The duty to consult does not tell us what and how much information must be 
communicated. We have seen that the test of materiality governs negligence and that battery 
requires basic information and, where children are concerned, this potentially extends to adequate 
information to enable a capacity assessment and a best interests decision incorporating the child’s 
perspective. Damages may flow if it can be shown that the consent was not valid on the basis that 
the treatment was not in the interests of the child. A failure to consult may result in battery and a 
declaration of violation of Article 8 if procedure is breached. If so, damages may be awarded if the 
breach impacts on treatment.  
The duty to consult differs according to the procedural requirements with respect to each 
age group. Under the MCA there must be enough information to facilitate capacity and it is 
significant that in Re S, Cobb J. opined that the same duty applies to children.142 But a duty to 
facilitate capacity does not necessarily require disclosure of material risks, benefits and alternative 
choices, such as is required in relation to ‘adults of sound mind’ under Montgomery. 
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Montgomery was a landmark decision that has since been extended to apply to other aspects of 
patient choice.143 Though children have the power to consent to treatment in some cases, their 
powers of choice are limited and their welfare is the paramount consideration. Breach of duty is 
but one part of the negligence inquiry. A failure to warn does not give rise to a free-standing claim 
in damages. While some jurists have made normative arguments about why such claims should be 
permitted,144 the Court of Appeal in Shaw v Kovac145 rejected this argument. It seems likely that the 
Supreme Court would agree: it refused permission to appeal in that case.146 In adult cases, claimants 
have struggled to show that a failure to disclose reasonable alternatives would have changed the 
outcome.147 It is for these reasons that many commentators have disputed the ability of the tort 
system to adequately protect patient autonomy.148 We suggest that these criticisms have additional 
force when it comes to children.  
There is scope to challenge the paternalistic interpretation of Gillick. As we have seen, one 
interpretation of Lord Scarman’s judgment in Gillick is that the child with capacity can make a 
determinative treatment decision. Sir James Munby in Re D recognised as a ‘fundamental principle’ 
set out in Gillick that ‘the exercise of parental responsibility comes to an end not on the attaining 
of some fixed age but on attaining ‘Gillick capacity’’.149 Mostyn J. has stated that it was implicit in 
Gillick that ‘provided the child, under the age of 16, has sufficient understanding and intelligence, 
she can then be lawfully prescribed with contraception even if the result of that would lead her to 
take steps which are wholly contrary to her best interests.’150 Might vindication in Montgomery of 
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Lord Scarman’s pro-patient position taken in Sidaway one day be emulated in relation to this aspect 
of his Lordship’s position in Gillick?  
 For now, an alternative view dominates, based on Lord Fraser’s judgment which appears 
to require that the treatment must be in the child’s best interests, and that there are cases where 
this can be determined by others, even where the child has capacity. The dominance of best 
interests in decisions about treatment of children limits the relevance of negligence. However, on 
the basis of procedural requirements to facilitate participation in order to determine capacity and 
best interests, it enhances the relevance of the tort of battery, which for adults offers only limited 
protection of their right to information. Like adults, children might claim in battery if no 
authorisation has been obtained for their treatment. Our focus has been on substandard 
information disclosure. We have considered three ways in which battery might be relevant in light 
of the test for Gillick capacity and the role of best interests. Because battery is actionable per se, this 
offers a powerful incentive to involve children in decisions made about them.  
However, it only goes so far. In practice, the courts have shown reluctance to protect 
patients from battery.151 Furthermore, where the HCP is satisfied that the decision is in the child’s 
best interests – for example where no reasonable alternatives exist, the child’s claim is undermined. 
More effective remedies may lie in the development of human rights claims associated with the 
duty to consult and the right to autonomy. Sir James Munby P. has lamented: 
 
our slowness in accepting the … profound implications of the undoubted fact that a 
child has, quite distinct from and sometimes in conflict with his or her parents, the 
important procedural rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention.152 
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In Montgomery, the law finally caught up with professional guidance on adult consent.153  Since 2007, 
the General Medical Council (GMC) has also set out guidance on information disclosure in relation 
to children. It establishes that the child’s best interests is the guiding principle in all decisions,154 
and emphasises the importance, where appropriate, of good communication between doctor and 
child.155 Breach can result in disciplinary action. The GMC also sets out what information should 
routinely be provided: 
You should provide information that is easy to understand and appropriate to their age 
and maturity about:  
a their conditions  
b the purpose of investigations and treatments you propose and what that involves, 
including pain, anaesthetics and stays in hospital  
c the chances of success and the risks of different treatment options, including not having 
treatment  
d who will be mainly responsible for and involved in their care  
e their right to change their minds or to ask for a second opinion.156  
 
The GMC advises that this information should only be kept from children if either that is their 
wish, or if it would cause them serious harm.157 In this respect, the professional requirements to 
disclose information to children closely mirror the duties in relation to adults as set out in 
Montgomery. HCPs are rightly advised to abide by this guidance lest they treat in a manner that 
conflicts with the child’s interests, which extend beyond clinical factors and cannot be accurately 
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ascertained without consultation. From the position of the child, however, the situations in which 
non-disclosure would give rise to a remedy in tort are limited.  
Montgomery reconciled the law on negligent non-disclosure of information in the case of 
adults with social and legal developments. Is information non-disclosure in the case of children 
another area where the law is behind the curve? We would argue that insofar as the law limits the 
rights of children with capacity to make medical treatment decisions contrary to their best interests, 
the tort of negligence is patently ill-suited to the protection of their autonomy. 
 
